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1261 
Tribal Sovereignty and Tobacco Control in  
State-Tribe Cigarette Compacts 
Compacts are powerful legal tools that states and tribes can use to 
negotiate agreements. One of the most interesting examples of state-tribe 
compacts is the cigarette compact, which is useful in combating the illicit 
cigarette trade. This Note argues that tribal leaders and states can more 
effectively reach this goal by (1) recognizing tribal sovereignty in and (2) 
keeping tobacco control at the heart of compact discussions.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, Leslie Thompson, an executive of tobacco behemoth 
R.J. Reynolds, pled guilty to money laundering.1 His offense: helping 
American smugglers gain access to the tobacco company’s Canadian 
cigarettes through the St. Regis Mohawk Indian reservation.2 
Thompson, of course, was not the only individual convicted in this 
operation. Other individuals, including at least one Native American, 
had previously been convicted for their involvement in the 
international black-market scheme as well.3 
This kind of international smuggling activity is just one example 
of illicit cigarette trading in the United States.4 Other individuals, for 
 
 1.  RJR Executive Helped Smugglers Sell Cigarettes Illegally in Canada, WALL STREET J. 
(Mar. 26, 1999, 11:17 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB92245673715819645 
[hereinafter RJR Executive]. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  See id. 
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example, try to avoid state or federal cigarette taxes by buying 
cigarettes from low-cost tribes, states, or countries and then selling 
them to residents of high-tax locations without paying the tax 
differentials.5 Once in these higher-tax locations, these cigarettes can 
either be used by the purchaser or resold at lower prices than locally 
taxed cigarettes.6 Individuals can also become involved in illicit 
cigarette dealings by selling cigarettes to those who are not authorized 
to purchase them (for example, Native American retailers selling state 
tax-exempt cigarettes to nontribe members).7  
With cigarette taxes higher than $3.50 per pack in some states and 
lower than $0.50 in others,8 vendors who sell low-tax cigarettes to 
residents of high-tax locations stand to pocket a significant profit. 
Reporter Christopher Mathias explains: 
If [a New York] bodega owner were to go about [selling cigarettes] 
the legal way, buying a pack of cigarettes at the wholesale price of 
$12.50, then retailing that pack for $13, he [would] only make[] 50 
cents profit. Each pack of cigarettes smuggled from out of state 
wholesales for about $5.50. The store owner can still sell those packs 
for $12.50. But suddenly, he’s making a $7 profit.9 
Because involvement in this kind of operation can lead to jail time 
and heavy fines, the risk of getting caught in this lucrative trade 
should, in theory, be high enough to deter certain types of illicit 
cigarette trading.10 However, the difficulty of tracking down 
 
 5.  See id. 
 6.  Christopher Mathias, Inside New York City’s Dangerous, Multimillion-
Dollar  Cigarette Black Market, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2014, 8:51 AM), http://www.huff 
ingtonpost.com/2014/04/03/cigarette-smuggling-new-york-_n_5041823.html. See generally 
Michael F. Lovenheim, How Far to the Border?: The Extent and Impact of Cross-Border Casual 
Cigarette Smuggling, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 7, 7 (2008) (discussing cigarette tax differentials along 
state borders). 
 7.  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., UNDERSTANDING THE U.S. 
ILLICIT TOBACCO MARKET: CHARACTERISTICS, POLICY CONTEXT, AND LESSONS FROM 
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 55–56 (Peter Reuter & Malay Majmundar eds., 2015) 
[hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL] (discussing the legal issues surrounding cigarette sales 
on tribal lands to non-Native Americans). 
 8. Ann Boonn, State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates & Rankings, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-
FREE KIDS (Aug. 9, 2017), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/
0097.pdf [hereinafter Boonn, Tax Rates]. 
 9.  Mathias, supra note 6. 
 10.  See, e.g., Fourteen People Indicted on Charges Involving a Bootleg Cigarette Scheme, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmo/pr/fourteen-
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bootleggers has made that risk less menacing, and consequently, illicit 
cigarette markets continue to exist.11 According to a 2014 Tax 
Foundation report, over half of the cigarette market in New York and 
Arizona is bootlegged, as well as over a quarter of the cigarette market 
in twelve other states.12 
There is a growing movement among government leaders and 
public health groups to end these kinds of illicit cigarette dealings, and 
for good reason—such dealings can cause major economic and public 
health problems. On the financial side, for example, it was reported in 
2011 that cigarette bootleggers were pocketing $525 million each 
year that were supposed to go to the state of New York.13 Meanwhile, 
selling low-cost cigarettes in high-tax areas has likely helped hook and 
keep vulnerable populations, like low-income adults and teenagers, 
addicted to smoking.14  
Government officials are using a variety of techniques to deal with 
the illicit cigarette trade issue, many of which involve specific 
legislation or multi-state negotiation tactics. However, this problem 
must also be addressed along the borders of some Native American 
tribal lands: a task that has proven difficult.15 Although Native 
Americans do not pay state taxes on cigarettes, they can be required 
to force non-Native Americans—and even Native Americans who 
belong to other tribes—to purchase cigarettes on tribal land at state 
tax rates.16 However, political tensions between states and tribes are 
 
people-indicted-charges-involving-bootleg-cigarette-scheme (“If convicted, conspiracy to traffic 
in contraband cigarettes and money laundering carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison, 
and/or a fine up to $250,000; each count of trafficking in contraband cigarettes carries a 
maximum of five years in prison and/or fines up to $250,000; each count of money laundering 
carries a maximum of 20 years in prison and/or fines up to $500,000.”). 
 11.  Mathias, supra note 6. 
 12.  Joseph Bishop-Henchman & Scott Drenkard, Cigarette Taxes and Cigarette 
Smuggling by State, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 19, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/cigarette-
taxes-and-cigarette-smuggling-state. 
 13.  Mathias, supra note 6. 
 14.  See Kevin C. Davis et al., Cigarette Trafficking in Five Northeastern US Cities, 23 
TOBACCO CONTROL e62, e66 (2014) (“We estimate that in NYC the effective price per pack 
would increase by as much as $2.90 if trafficking was eliminated and would result in decreases 
in youth and adult smoking.”). 
 15.  See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 56. 
 16.  Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 
153–59 (1980). 
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strong,17 and state governments have limited authority to enforce state 
taxes on tribal land,18 so this does not always happen. Some Native 
Americans smuggle low-cost cigarettes across international borders 
that are then sold in high-tax locations.19 Others sell cigarettes online 
to non-Native American residents without adding applicable state 
taxes.20 And, in other cases, tribal retailers sell cigarettes on their land 
to nonresidents state-tax free.21 
One approach to combating the illicit cigarette market is to bring 
state and tribal governments to the negotiating table to develop a 
solution that works for both parties. The result of these negotiations 
often comes in the form of a special intergovernmental contract 
known as a “compact.”22 Compacts have been used to finalize state-
tribe negotiations on a variety of issues—from water rights23 to casino 
rights24—and compacts for cigarette taxes work in a similar manner. 
As a legal tool, cigarette compacts have the potential to make cigarette 
taxation more consistent across borders and protect economic and 
health interests among both Native Americans and non-Native 
Americans.  And, in fact, evidence suggests that at least some cigarette 
compacts are helping curb illicit cigarette dealings on tribal land.25 
 
 17.  See, e.g., Catherine Thorbecke, Tensions Mount as Native American Tribe Fights to 
Block Oil Pipeline, ABC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2016, 4:44 PM), http://abcnews.go
.com/US/tensions-mount-native-american-tribe-fights-block-oil/story?id= 41891717. 
 18.  FRANK J. CHALOUPKA ET AL., NAT’L CTR FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION AND 
HEALTH PROMOTION, PREVENTING AND REDUCING ILLICIT TOBACCO TRADE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 34 (2015) (“[J]urisdictional issues can make it difficult for states to enforce tax 
collection on nonmembers or non-Native Americans who purchase tobacco on tribal lands.”). 
 19.  See, e.g., RJR Executive, supra note 1. 
 20. Despite Law, Tribe Sells 1.7 Tons of Cigarettes Online, N.Y. POST (Dec. 2, 2013, 10:11 
AM) (quoting Nativeblend.net), http://nypost.com/2013/12/02/despite-law-tribe-sells-1-
7-tons-of-cigarettes-online/ . 
 21.  See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 56. 
 22.  See Compact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“An agreement or 
covenant between two or more parties, esp. between governments or states.”). 
 23.  See, e.g., Jennifer E. Pelphrey, Oklahoma’s State/Tribal Water Compact: Three Cheers 
for Compromise, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 127 (2004). 
 24.  See, e.g., Rubin Ranat, Note, Tribal-State Compacts: Legitimate or Illegal Taxation of 
Indian Gaming in California?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 953 (2005). 
 25.  In one Washington State study, for example, authors concluded that: “Enforcement, 
tobacco control policies, and compacts with Indian tribes are among the factors that have kept 
illegal sales in check.”  STEPHEN D. SMITH & VAN HUYNH, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF REVENUE, 
WASHINGTON STATE CIGARETTE CONSUMPTION REVISITED 12 (2007), https://dor.wa.gov/ 
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In practice, however, these kinds of compacts are sometimes 
written in ways that frustrate their greater potential as legal and 
political instruments. Ideally, cigarette compacts bring tribes and 
states together as allies to curb illicit cigarette dealings. However, 
cigarette compacts sometimes (1) treat tribal groups as unequal 
partners in the negotiating process or (2) fail to dedicate cigarette tax 
funds to smoking prevention and control.  
A recent compact between the Cherokee Nation and the State of 
Oklahoma26 provides a good example of these two phenomena. Parts 
of the compact’s recitals seem to show slight disrespect for tribal 
sovereignty.27 While the compact recognizes tribal sovereignty, it also 
declares that the powers of the tribal government have been 
recognized by the federal government as merely “extant”28 and asserts 
state authority to pull taxes from cigarettes sold on nontribal land.29 
There is also no mention of financial earmarking for tobacco control 
in the compact.30  
These two issues do not necessarily make cigarette compacts 
ineffective—just less effective than they potentially could be.31 It is 
 
sites/default/files/legacy/Docs/reports/CigStudyJan11_2007.pdf. Data on the effectiveness 
of cigarette compacts appear to be limited. 
 26.  Tobacco Tax Compact Between the State of Oklahoma and the Cherokee Nation 
(filed Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/filelog/89635.pdf [hereinafter 
Tobacco Tax Compact]. 
 27.  See id. art. 1, at 1–2. 
 28.  Id. One of the definitions of “extant” in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, and likely 
the one intended here, is “still existing: not destroyed or lost.” Extant, Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extant (last visited Nov. 27, 2017). 
In the words of one author, a federal court once described tribal sovereignty as “extant unless 
that power is divested by Act of Congress or treaty” MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW 244 (2016). 
 29.  Tobacco Tax Compact, supra note 26, art. I, at 2. 
 30.  Id. at 1–11. 
 31.  It should be noted that there does not appear to be data specifically on the impact of 
including public health and tribal considerations in cigarette compacts on the illicit cigarette 
trade. The purpose of this Note is not to prove empirically that these two considerations work 
but that they are logical avenues for strengthening current compacts.  Moreover, when a 
cigarette compact that happens to incorporate these two elements is shown to be associated with 
tribal compacting, many other factors, like the previously existing relationship between the state 
and tribe, other smoking interventions, and the tribe’s enforcement capacity, may also be at play. 
Therefore, any data used to support these assertions should be interpreted with caution.  
However, robust data collection and future scholarship on the usefulness of adding these 
measures to currently existing compacts would provide welcomed valuable insight into this 
subject matter. 
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logical to assume that when tribes are treated as full allies in a cigarette 
compact negotiation, they are more likely to make mutually beneficial 
agreements and follow through on their compact obligations.32 It is 
also logical to assume that when funds from cigarette taxes are 
funneled back into effective tobacco prevention and control initiatives, 
the proportion of the population interested in smoking—and, by 
extension, in undertaxed cigarettes—will likely shrink.33 Therefore, 
when a compact (1) fully considers tribal sovereignty and (2) earmarks 
proceeds for tobacco prevention and control, it becomes a more 
powerful compact, at least as far as combating the illicit cigarette trade 
is concerned. 
The three purposes of this Note are to (1) explain in greater depth 
why tribal sovereignty and tobacco control are such helpful 
components in state-tribe cigarette compact negotiations; (2) show 
how these two elements have been ignored in some state-tribe 
cigarette compacts; and (3) suggest techniques to incorporate both 
elements more fully in those agreements. Part II will describe the 
foundations of cigarette tax law and the specific cigarette trade issues 
that pertain to tribal land. Part III will discuss the variety of tools states 
have used to address the problem, including compacts. Part IV will 
explain why incorporating tribal sovereignty and public health into 
negotiations has the potential to improve compact effectiveness and 
will also analyze the use of those themes in two recent Kansas 
compacts. Part V will make specific recommendations on how tribal 
sovereignty and public welfare considerations can be more effectively 
included in tribal compacting schemes. Part VI will conclude. 
 
 32.  See, e.g., SUSAN JOHNSON ET AL., GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT MODELS OF 
COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES AND TRIBES 4 (2009) (“State-tribal cooperation can be key to 
achieving improved government services.”). 
 33.  See, e.g., David T. Levy, Frank Chaloupka & Joseph Gitchell, The Effects of Tobacco 
Control Policies on Smoking Rates: A Tobacco Control Scorecard, 10 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & 
PRAC. 338 (2004) (describing the impact of various tobacco control strategies on smoking rates 
in the United States). Tobacco control strategies might need to be specifically targeted to the 
population of smokers interested in illicit cigarettes to have this kind of impact. 
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II. CIGARETTE TAXES AND NATIVE AMERICAN LAND 
A. Foundations of the Cigarette Tax 
Between the late 1800s and early 1920s, long before the first 
epidemiological studies found associations between lung cancer and 
cigarette use in the 1930s,34 at least fourteen states and Canada 
decided to ban cigarette sales.35 The ban was not entirely rooted in 
health but in the perceived immorality of smoking, which, along with 
drinking and gambling, was considered a vice by members of the 
Progressive movement.36 
Although these restrictions were lifted in the United States during 
the 1920s,37 the negative public perception of cigarettes was never 
permanently stubbed out. Starting before the Second World War and 
continuing through the 1960s, epidemiologists, animal researchers, 
cellular pathologists, and chemists started to build a consensus in 
global research about the detrimental health effects of smoking.38 This 
evidence, likely coupled with the popular philosophy that goods 
taxation was an appropriate way to generate government income,39 
provided a foundation for the development of cigarette taxes in the 
United States in the later twentieth century. 
Today, cigarette tax rates are ubiquitous in our country, although 
state cigarette taxes vary widely.40 According to one recent report, 
North Dakota taxes its residents at $0.44 per pack, while its neighbor 
 
 34.  Robert N. Proctor, The History of the Discovery of the Cigarette—Lung Cancer Link: 
Evidentiary Traditions, Corporate Denial, Global Toll, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 87, 87–
88 (2012). 
 35.  Compare FRITZ L. LAUX & STEFANIE D. BUCKSKIN, AN OKLAHOMA HISTORY OF 
CIGARETTE TAXATION 4 (2015) (citing MAURINE BROWN NEUBERGER, SMOKE SCREEN: 
TOBACCO AND THE PUBLIC WELFARE 52 (1963)), http://tobacconomics.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/08/Laux_OKTribal_08-24-15.pdf, with Lee J. Alston, Ruth Dupré & Tomas 
Nonnenmacher, Social Reformers and Regulation: The Prohibition of Cigarettes in the United 
States and Canada, 39 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 425, 426 (2002) (listing fifteen states 
and Canada as banning cigarettes around that time). 
 36.  Alston, Dupré & Nonnenmacher, supra note 35, at 426. 
 37.  LAUX & BUCKSKIN, supra note 35. 
 38.  Proctor, supra note 34. 
 39.  See, e.g., Devin A. Rheaume, A Growing Sin-dustry: The History and Effects of 
Cigarette Excise Taxation and Regulation in the United States 3–4 (unpublished honors theses, 
University of New Hampshire, Paper No. 263), http://scholars.unh.edu/honors/263/. 
 40.  Boonn, Tax Rates, supra note 8, at 1. 
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to the east, Minnesota, taxes its residents at $3.04 per pack.41 
Meanwhile, the local and state combined tax rate in Chicago for a pack 
of cigarettes runs at a steep $6.16.42 Despite this geographic variation 
in state tax rates, however, cigarettes on the whole have been described 
as some of the highest-taxed commodities in our country, along with 
alcohol, guns, plane tickets, and gasoline.43 Currently, state taxes on 
cigarettes average $1.71 per pack, while the federal government slaps 
on an additional $1.01 per pack.44 
Some may argue that these cigarette taxes exist today simply to 
produce increased revenue for the government. However, while 
revenue generation is clearly a strong motivator for any type of tax, 
and the health burden of cigarette smoking certainly adds persuasive 
merit to that request for additional revenue,45 the extremely high rate 
of cigarette taxes in our country suggests that there may be another 
powerful trigger behind these laws.  
According to economists, anti-smoking advocates, and the 
tobacco industry itself, cigarette taxes reduce smoking rates.46 In fact, 
the higher taxes are, the more effective taxes become at deterring 
smoking behavior. According to the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, 
“The general consensus is that nationally, every 10 percent increase in 
the real price of cigarettes reduces . . . smoking among young adults 
by about 3.5 percent, reduces the number of kids who smoke by six 
or seven percent, and reduces overall cigarette consumption by 
approximately three to five percent.”47  
Some states take this anti-smoking incentive even further by 
earmarking tax revenues for anti-smoking initiatives. Under 
Proposition 99, for example, the State of California dedicated a 
 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Helen Harvey, What Are Some of the Highest Taxed Items?, SAPLING (May 8, 2011), 
https://www.sapling.com/8377758/highest-taxed-items. 
 44.  Boonn, Tax Rates, supra note 8, at 1. 
 45.  Laura Bach, Toll of Tobacco in the United States of America, CAMPAIGN FOR 
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS 1 (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/fact 
sheets/pdf/0072.pdf. 
 46.  Ann Boonn, Raising Cigarette Taxes Reduces Smoking, Especially Among Kids (and 
the Cigarette Companies Know It), CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS 1–2 (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0146.pdf. 
 47.  Id. at 1. 
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quarter of those tax revenues to tobacco control and research.48 
Tobacco control earmarking is important for two reasons: First, it 
works. Research has consistently shown that tobacco control initiatives 
can have a powerful impact on smoking prevalence.49 Second, when 
funds are earmarked for tobacco control rather than unrelated 
services, like roads or schools, states have an incentive to see smoking 
rates drop.50  
Considering the steepness of cigarette taxes in some areas of the 
country and the rationale behind those taxes, it is easy to understand 
why cigarette vendors might try to keep the industry alive by 
circumventing the tax system. These vendors thwart key purposes of 
cigarette taxes by helping new smokers become addicted to cigarettes, 
keeping experienced smokers addicted, and denying states needed 
revenue that can be used to address associated public health costs. In 
other words, illicit cigarette dealings prevent cigarette tax increases 
from supporting tobacco prevention and control efforts. 
B. Illicit Cigarette Dealings on Native American Land 
The tension between Native American tribes and states on 
cigarette tax issues must be addressed in order to combat the illicit 
cigarette trade. Today, 567 federally recognized tribes dot our 
country,51 with tribal land scattered across the majority of states.52 
 
 48.  Frank J. Chaloupka, Ayda Yurekli & Geoffrey T. Fong, Tobacco Taxes as a Tobacco 
Control Strategy, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 172, 175 (2012). 
 49.  See, e.g., Matthew C. Farrelly et al., The Impact of Tobacco Control Programs on Adult 
Smoking, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 304, 308–09 (2008) (“[There has been] extensive research 
demonstrating the effectiveness of state tobacco control programs . . . . [Our] findings 
strengthen the evidence that state tobacco control programs reduce adult smoking prevalence 
and have an effect that is independent of increased cigarette prices. The results also show that 
funding for such programs is a valuable investment. By not sufficiently funding programs at least 
at the CDC recommended minimum levels, states are missing an opportunity to substantially 
reduce smoking-related mortality, morbidity, and economic costs.”). 
 50.  See generally Caroline May, What Would a Smoke-Free America Cost the Government?, 
DAILY CALLER (Feb. 28, 2011, 1:05 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2011/02/28/what-would-
an-america-without-smokers-cost/. 
 51.  About Us, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR INDIAN AFFAIRS, https://www.bia.gov/about-us 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 52.  Hillary DeLong et al., Common State Mechanisms Regulating Tribal Tobacco 
Taxation and Sales, the USA, 2015, 25 TOBACCO CONTROL i32, i32 (2016), http://tobacco 
control.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/25/Suppl_1/i32.full.pdf. 
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Over centuries of legislation and litigation,53 these tribal groups have 
established themselves as largely self-governing bodies, with some 
powers rivaling those of states.54 When it comes to cigarette sales on 
reservations, tribe members are exempt from paying state taxes for 
cigarettes55 and have authority to impose their own taxes for cigarettes 
sold on their land.56 However, cigarettes sold on tribal land often cost 
much less than state-taxed cigarettes.57 
Of course, federal law expressly permits only local tribe members to 
purchase cigarettes free of state tax on tribal land.58 In fact, even selling 
tax-free products from reservations to nontribe members online is 
prohibited under the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (PACT) Act of 
2009.59 Despite these legal restrictions, as in most black-market 
industries, finding and enforcing offenders under federal and state law 
is difficult.60 The availability of state tax-exempt cigarettes on tribal 
property creates many opportunities for bootlegging. In one New 
York study, the percentage of smokers who reported buying cigarettes 
from reservations increased in the year following a state cigarette tax 
hike.61 Around the same time, when cigarettes on Washington tribal 
land cost about sixty-five percent less than those sold in the rest of the 
state, about one-fifth of smokers in the area reported buying 
 
 53.  See generally Marilyn Phelan, A History and Analysis of Laws Protecting Native 
American Cultures, 45 TULSA L. REV. 45 (2009). 
 54. See CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 34. It should be noted that tribal 
sovereignty differs in some ways from state sovereignty. For example, tribal courts cannot try 
nontribe members for crimes committed on reservations. Sierra Crane-Murdoch, On Indian 
Land, Criminals Can Get Away with Almost Anything, ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2013), http:// 
www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/on-indian-land-criminals-can-get-away-with 
-almost-anything/273391/. 
 55. CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 34. 
 56. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 
152–54 (1980). 
 57. See CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 37. 
 58. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Res., 447 U.S. at 160–61. 
 59. Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–154, 124 Stat. 1087, 
1091 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 376a(a)(3) (2012)). 
 60. Jon Campbell, Smuggled, Untaxed Cigarettes Are Everywhere in New York City, 
VILLAGE VOICE (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.villagevoice.com/news/smuggled-untaxed-cigare 
ttes-are-everywhere-in-new-york-city-6717621. The legality of cigarettes makes enforcement 
even more difficult than for other black-market industries. Id. 
 61. BRETT LOOMIS ET AL., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, IMPLICATIONS OF THE JUNE 
2008 $1.25 CIGARETTE TAX INCREASE 3–4 (2010), https://www.health.ny.gov/prevention/ 
tobacco_control/docs/2010-11-12_tax_increase_topical_report.pdf. 
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reservation cigarettes.62 Some tribal retailers have even taken to selling 
their products tax free online, using language like “NO STATE 
TAXES, NO REPORTS to anyone EVER and NO Surprise 
Tax  Bills.”63 
The illicit cigarette trade has been used by some Native Americans 
to build financial independence.64 Moreover, some Native American 
businesses feel squeezed out by federal and state taxes and other legal 
restrictions on cigarette sales.65 Meanwhile, some tribes are internally 
conflicted about their own participation in the tobacco industry.66 The 
profits from that industry are not always enjoyed equitably among 
tribal members.67 Furthermore, some tribes are openly opposed to 
using commercial cigarettes for religious reasons,68 some tribes are 
trying to diversify economically,69 and others have concerns about 
tribal public health.70 
It is in this unsettled, conflicted environment that illicit cigarette 
sales are taking place on tribal reservations, both through the internet 
and in tribal retail shops. Both states and tribes stand to gain from 
initiatives that curb smoking and improve state-tribe relations. The 
next part of this Note will describe what states and tribes have been 
doing to address the problem of illicit cigarette dealings, including the 
use of stamps and compacts. 
 
 62. DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i32 (presenting statistical information provided by 
the U.S. Department of Commerce and National Cancer Institute). 
 63. Despite Law, Tribe Sells 1.7 Tons of Cigarettes Online, supra note 20. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See Kari A. Samuel, Kurt M. Ribisl & Rebecca S. Williams, Internet Cigarette Sales 
and Native American Sovereignty: Political and Public Health Contexts, 33 J. PUB. HEALTH 
POL’Y 173, 177 (2012). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See KEEP IT SACRED NAT’L NATIVE NETWORK, http://keepitsacred.itcmi.org/ (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 69. See, e.g., PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION, http://www.pbpindiantribe.com 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2018) (follow menu icon and click on “Business” tab for various examples 
of enterprises). 
 70. Tribal Public Health Law, NAT’L INDIAN HEALTH BOARD, http://www
.nihb.org/public_health/tribal_public_health_law.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
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III. STATE TACTICS 
To combat illicit cigarette dealings involving Native American 
retailers, states have the authority to require tribes to sell taxed 
cigarettes to nontribe members.71 With this goal in mind, states have 
primarily used two tools to enforce the sale of taxed cigarettes—(1) 
state laws and (2) state-tribal agreements or compacts.72 
A. State Cigarette Laws 
More than half of states containing tribal land have their own 
codified laws governing tribal cigarette sales.73 These laws provide 
tribe members with state-tax free cigarettes purchased on the 
reservation while ensuring that states keep their own cigarette tax 
revenues. Some of the most common state laws create coupon 
systems, cigarette quotas, tax stamps, and refunds.74 
1. Coupons 
Coupon systems work by requiring tribes to import taxed 
cigarettes while granting tribes coupons to buy cigarettes state-tax 
free.75 In Florida, for example, these coupons pass from the states to 
reservation cigarette retailers who then present the coupons to 
purchase tax-free cigarettes to wholesale dealers.76 The program has 
advantages and disadvantages; for example, a coupon system may seem 
relatively efficient for users, but it is unclear to what extent coupons 
are used to benefit only tribal members.77 
 
 71. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 
159 (1980) (“The State may validly require . . . the tribal smokeshops to affix tax stamps 
purchased from the State to individual packages of cigarettes prior to the time of sale to 
nonmembers of the Tribe.”). 
 72. DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i33. Note that the statistics used here are based in 
part on a review of laws from 2015, and these data may have changed since then. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id.; CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 38. 
 75.  DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i33. 
 76.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 210.1801(2) (West 2011). 
 77.  See CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 34–35 (criticism of the quota system that 
applies to use of coupons). 
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2. Quotas 
In a quota-based system, tribes receive a certain number of tax-
free cigarettes based on estimated tribal consumption and the rest are 
taxed.78 On its own, the quota system is riddled with holes. There is 
no way to ensure that only tribal members receive tax-free products, 
and tribes may receive more tax-free cigarettes than they need.79 This 
may be why two of the six states using a quota system at the beginning 
of 2015 supplemented it with coupons or vouchers.80 
3. Tax stamps 
Tax stamps are a common taxed-cigarette enforcement tool that 
can be used either alone or in tandem with other plans. Similar to a 
coupon system, tax prepayment requires tribes to pay for cigarette 
taxes up-front and, in some cases, receive a rebate for the cigarettes 
that will be purchased by tribal members.81 At the beginning of 2015, 
twelve states used a tax prepayment system in addition to or in lieu of 
tax stamps.82 Tax stamps can also be used in a variety of ways, such as 
on all cigarettes,83 on cigarettes sorted by tribe, or on cigarettes sorted 
by tax method.84 Utah, for example, applies stamps to tobacco 
products sold to nontribe members.85  
 
 78.  Id. at 34; Philip DeCicca, Donald Kenkel & Feng Liu, Reservation Prices: An 
Economic Analysis of Cigarette Purchases on Indian Reservations 9 (Nat’l Institutes of Health, 
Working Paper No. 20778, 2013), http://www.appam.org/assets/1/7/Reservation_
Prices_An_Economic_Analysis_of_Cigarette_Purchases_on_Indian_Reservations.pdf. 
 79.  CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 34–35. 
 80.  DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i34 tbl. 2 (see footnote under “Allotment of tax-
free tribal tobacco”). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at i34. 
 83.  The Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids recommends affixing a stamp to tax-free 
cigarettes as a way to provide government data on tax-free cigarettes and prevent tax-exempt 
cigarettes from being sold illegally. State Options to Prevent and Reduce Cigarette Smuggling and 
Block Other Illegal State Tobacco Tax Evasion, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS 1, 
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0274.pdf. 
 84.  See, e.g., CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 38; DeLong et al., supra note 52, at 
i33–i34. 
 85.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-14-204.5(2)(c)(i) (West 2017); DeLong et al., supra note 
52, at i36. 
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4. Difficulties with the state and federal law systems 
While these state laws have some advantages, they lack the ability 
to unify state and tribal governments in addressing the cigarette 
bootlegging problem the way state-tribal compacts can. When states 
assume that their own or federal law provisions like the PACT Act are 
sufficient to stop illicit cigarette dealings, they do so naively. States 
cannot enforce such laws alone, and tribes have little incentive to help 
states in their enforcement efforts. State and federal cigarette tax laws 
place a burden on tribes without tribal consent or benefit. 
Understandably, some Native Americans view the imposition of these 
state laws as an attack on their tribal right of self-governance.86 
Consequently, states are sometimes left to enforce these laws without 
tribal support—a situation that makes it difficult to improve state-
tribal relations and stamp out the illicit cigarette trade. 
The PACT Act, for example, covers online cigarette operations, 
but site operators can shut down their websites when discovered and 
create others in their place.87 And even when an online tribal retailer 
is caught selling untaxed products out of state, that retailer’s sales to 
the state may be so minimal that due process concerns in taxation and 
jurisdiction arise.88 States also face an uphill battle controlling sales of 
untaxed cigarettes to nontribal members on tribal property. Hillary 
DeLong and colleagues explain, “[S]tates do not have jurisdiction on 
tribal lands, and are unable to use the court system to pursue back 
taxes. These . . . issues, coupled with a [situation] where some 
consumers are tax-exempt while others are not, can make state 
collection of taxes owed for tobacco sales to nontribal 
consumers  difficult.”89  
Tribes may have greater awareness of cigarette sales schemes and 
ability to enforce cigarette laws in these situations than states do, but 
there is little incentive to do so when operating under a law that the 
 
 86.  See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 166. 
 87.  Brian Hickey, The PACT ACT: Preventing Illegal Internet Sales of Cigarettes & 
Smokeless Tobacco, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www. 
tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0361.pdf. 
 88.  PACT Act, PUB. HEALTH & TOBACCO POL’Y CTR., http://tobaccopolicycenter.org 
/tobacco-control/recent-cases/pact-act/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 89.  DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i32. 
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tribe did not help create and may not support. 90 As Kari Samuel and 
colleagues explain: “[A]ny successful strategy to control Native 
tobacco sales will probably emerge from agreements negotiated 
between tribal and state governments rather than external attempts to 
regulate such sales directly.”91 
B. Compacts 
Compacts are generally superior to state laws as tools for 
strengthening relations between tribes and states. These special 
agreements have been used to resolve issues related to casinos between 
tribes and states for some time.92 Such agreements can also prove 
helpful in curbing the illicit cigarette trade. 
Compacts do this by placing trust in tribes as sovereign partners.93 
When a state engages in compact negotiations with a tribe, the state 
shows that it values tribal authority and that it wants to create an 
agreement that benefits both parties. Moreover, while state laws may 
include a tax revenue sharing component,94 revenue sharing or 
collecting is a common feature in compacts.95 Doing so reduces tax 
differentials between states and tribes and returns tax revenue to the 
tribal government, sometimes for health programs.96 This type of 
agreement incentivizes tribes to enforce tax provisions themselves and 
regulate on-reservation manufactured cigarettes that cannot be 
enforced with quotas, stamps, or refunds.97 
 
 90.  See, e.g., Kari A. Samuel, Kurt M. Ribisl & Rebecca S. Williams, supra note 66, at 
181 (2012) (“Public relations campaigns in 2010 by the Seneca Nation suggest the Nation 
viewed the PACT Act as a threat from the start.”). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  See, e.g., Indian Gaming Compacts, U.S. DEP’T INT. INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
http://www.indianaffairs.gov/WhoWeAre/AS-IA/OIG/Compacts/index.htm (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2017). It should be noted that the implementation of gambling compacts between 
states and tribes has not been flawless. Recently, the California legislature was sued by a 
California tribe for failing to approve of a gambling contract “in good faith” when a governor-
negotiated compact was never voted on by the legislature, despite the tribe’s insistence, and 
subsequently expired. Estom Yumeka Maidu Tribe v. California, 163 F. Supp. 3d 769, 771, 781 
(E.D. Cal. 2016). 
 93.  See DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i34–i35. 
 94.  See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-14-204.5(2)(c)(ii) (West 2017). 
 95.  DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i35 tbl. 3. 
 96.  CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 38. 
 97.  See id. at 35. 
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At the beginning of 2015, fourteen states used cigarette tax 
compact schemes, including Washington, Wisconsin, and 
Minnesota.98 At least one other state—Kansas—has created compacts 
since that time.99  
IV. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TOBACCO CONTROL IN COMPACTS 
Compacts are a potentially powerful tool for curbing illicit 
cigarette dealings. This is because compacts bring tribal leaders to the 
negotiating table, a process that is surely more likely than a state law 
to motivate leaders to follow through on enforcement obligations. 
However, compacts can curb the illicit cigarette trade more effectively 
by ensuring that tribes receive meaningful benefits and earmarking 
funds for tobacco prevention and control. In this Part, I will describe 
two cigarette compacts and explain how compacts can be improved to 
better incorporate elements of tribal sovereignty and public health. 
A. A Tale of Two Compacts 
In 2003, the State of Kansas faced a financial problem. There was 
concern that four large cigarette companies would stop making 
payments to the state under the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement—
payments that were supposed to provide $60 million in annual funds 
for state children’s programs and other causes—because of cigarette 
tracking problems.100 The state decided to fix this issue and focused 
particularly on cigarette sales on Native American reservation land in 
order to do so.101  
The State entered into two compacts in early 2016.102 The first was 
entered into with the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation on February 
 
 98.  DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i33–i34 tbl.2; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
supra note 7, at 128–29 box 5-4. 
 99.  Compact Relating to Cigarette and Tobacco Sales and Taxation, 35 KAN. REG. 331, 
349 (2016), https://www.kssos.org/pubs/register%5C2016%5CVol_35_No_16_April_21_20 
16_pages_331-370.pdf. 
 100. See Melissa Hellman, 2 Tribes, State of Kansas Enter into Cigarette-Sale Compacts, 
TOPEKA CAP.-J. (Apr. 7, 2016, 5:20 PM), http://cjonline.com/news/2016-04-07/2-tribes-
state-kansas-enter-cigarette-sale-compacts. 
 101.  See id. 
 102.  See id. 
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17th of that year,103 while the second was adopted by resolution with 
the Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska on February 22nd.104 
Although the purpose of this analysis is to examine the tribal 
sovereignty and public health aspects of these two compacts, it will be 
helpful to first describe each of these tribes and the nature of the 
agreements that they were involved in creating. 
1. The Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation 
The Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation is a Kansas tribe that 
originated near the Great Lakes.105 After their land was illegally taken 
from them, they were forced south to Kansas, where after twenty years 
of negotiations, the tribe finally settled on a small plot of land.106 
Today, about 5000 individuals are considered members of the tribe,107 
though only about 700 of those members live on the reservation.108 
The tribe runs several businesses, including a casino, a golf course, and 
a business entity devoted to diversifying the tribe’s economic 
interests.109 Nation members sell cigarettes through local 
convenience  stores.110 
 
 103.  Compact Relating to Cigarette and Tobacco Sales, Taxation and Escrow Collection 
1, 20 (Feb. 17, 2016), https://ag.ks.gov/docs/default-source/documents/2016-2-17-
compact---prairie-band-signed.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [hereinafter Potawatomi Nation Compact] 
(compact between Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation and the State of Kansas). 
 104.  Compact Relating to Cigarette and Tobacco Sales and Taxation 1, 12 (Feb. 22, 
2016), https://ag.ks.gov/docs/default-source/documents/2016-2-22-compact---iowa-tribe-
signed.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [hereinafter Iowa Tribe Compact] (compact between Iowa Tribe of Kansas 
and Nebraska and the State of Kansas). 
 105.  Tribal History, PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION, http://www.pbpindiantribe. 
com/tribal-history (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 106.  See id. 
 107.  Enrollment, PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION, http://www.pbpindiantribe.com 
/enrollment/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 108. A Vision of Accomplishment, PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION, http://www
.pbpindiantribe.com/vision-of-accomplishment.aspx [https://web.archive.org/web/2017032 
4012908/http://www.pbpindiantribe.com/vision-of-accomplishment.aspx] (last visited Jan. 
1, 2018). 
 109.  Tribal Enterprises, PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION, http://www. 
pbpindiantribe.com/enrollment [https://web.archive.org/web/20170324005727/http:// 
www.pbpindiantribe.com/tribal-enterprises.aspx] (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 110.  Potawatomi Retail, PRAIRIE BAND LLC, http://prairiebandllc.com/Companies/ 
PotawatomiRetail.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
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2. The Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska 
The Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska is one of two tribal 
branches stemming from the Ioway tribe.111 The other is the Iowa 
Tribe of Oklahoma.112 The Ioway Indians were at one time located in 
the upper Midwest,113 but over the course of time, travel, and dealings 
with the United States government,114 the geographic borders of the 
Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska became restricted to the Kansas-
Nebraska border.115 Like the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, the 
Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska maintains a casino, but it also has 
a farm and a gas station.116 At the Grandview Oil convenience store 
located on the tribal lands, the tribe sells Native American 
manufacturer brands.117 
Knowing the background of these two tribes provides a basic lens 
through which to view questions of tribal sovereignty and tobacco 
control in cigarette compacting. Although these two tribes share 
geographic ties now, they have two distinct geographical and 
genealogical origins, with differing traditions and cultural 
perspectives. This understanding will help frame some of the 
differences between the two agreements these tribes established with 
the Kansas state government in early 2016. 
The remainder of this Part will examine the two cigarette 
compacts these tribes negotiated with the State of Kansas, specifically 
analyzing how these compacts treat tribal sovereignty and 
tobacco  control. 
 
 111.  See MARTHA ROYCE BLAINE, THE IOWAY INDIANS (1979) (giving an overview of the 
history and current state of the Ioway Indians). 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 7. 
 114.  The Ioway Indians, LEGENDS OF KANSAS, http://www.legendsofkansas.
com/iowayindians.html (last updated Jan. 12, 2018). 
 115.  Id.; Ioway Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska, BAXOJE, IOWAY NATION, 
http://ioway.nativeweb.org/iowayksne.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 116.  IOWA TRIBE OF KAN. AND NEB., http://iowatribeofkansasandnebraska.com/ (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2018) (follow “Tribal Enterprise” tab, click on each subheading for 
more  information). 
 117.  Megan Hart, Gov. Sam Brownback: Changes to Reservation Tobacco Sales Needed to 
Keep Settlement Money, TOPEKA CAP.-J., http://cjonline.com/news-business-local-state/2015-
02-19/gov-sam-brownback-changes-reservation-tobacco-sales-needed-keep (last updated Feb. 
20, 2015, 9:00 AM) (referencing tribal chairman, Tim Rhodd). 
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B. Tribal Sovereignty 
Compacts are a superior tool for combating illicit cigarette 
dealings because they are formed only after Native American and state 
leaders come together to create a solution that works for both parties. 
In other words, compact-making, in theory, recognizes Native 
American tribes and their members for what they truly are—
government leaders with independent, distinct powers and fellow 
American citizens who deserve respect. This section will discuss what 
tribal sovereignty is and why it matters in cigarette compacting.   
Due to the complicated history between the United States and 
Native American tribes, Native American tribes are essentially 
considered quasi-distinct nations that have the right to govern 
themselves.118  Native American tribal governments existed before the 
United States came into being, and their systems of governance have 
never been entirely merged with or dissolved into the American 
system.119 Over the course of centuries, the United States’ 
acknowledgment of Native American sovereignty has been established 
and re-emphasized through government treaties, court rulings, and 
legislation.120 Even in the U.S. Constitution, Native American tribes 
are acknowledged as entities distinct from states and foreign 
governments.121 It is for these reasons that, as Sandra Day O’Connor 
once explained: “Today, in the United States, we have three types of 
sovereign entities—[T]he Federal government, the states, and the 
Indian tribes. Each of the[se] sovereigns . . . plays an important role . 
 
 118.  See generally Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal 
Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule (Harv. Univ., Working Paper No. 
RWP04-016, 2004). 
 119.  Lindsay Cutler, Tribal Sovereignty, Tribal Court Legitimacy, and Public Defense, 63 
UCLA L. REV. 1752, 1755 (2016). See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 
(1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 
(8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 120.  Gavin Clarkson & Jim Sebenius, Leveraging Tribal Sovereignty for Economic 
Opportunity: A Strategic Negotiations Perspective, 76 MO. L. REV. 1045, 1048–55 (2011). 
 121.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress’s power includes the right “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”). 
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. . in this country.”122 Today, Native American tribes have their own 
court systems, laws, and tax systems.123 
Unfortunately, state and federal leaders sometimes undervalue 
potential partnerships that they can form with peers in tribal 
leadership. This has been demonstrated numerous times—for 
example, the United States government has tried to eliminate tribal 
leadership by assimilating Native Americans into Western culture124 
and has sold tribal land without consent.125 Other Native American 
tribes have been forcibly relocated from their homes and livelihoods 
for dam construction,126 had pro-Native American laws criticized as 
unfair,127 and experienced difficulties obtaining federal recognition.128 
According to one writer, the government’s micromanagement of 
Indian affairs has made it difficult for tribes to develop economically 
due to the amount of red tape involved in permitting and business 
development.129 And in 2016, protesters accused the Army Corps of 
Engineers of failing to consult with the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe of 
North Dakota before permitting a nearby massive oil pipeline that 
threatened their water supply and sacred sites.130  
When events like these happen—i.e., when a state or federal entity 
attempts to regulate tribal actions or skirt around tribal policies with 
its own laws—government officials disrespect tribal leadership, impede 
 
 122.  Clarkson & Sebenius, supra note 120, at 1056 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1, 
1 (1997)). 
 123.  See Kalt & Singer, supra note 118, at 16–17. 
 124.  Clarkson & Sebenius, supra note 120, at 1055. 
 125.  Id. at 1049–50. 
 126.  Trymaine Lee, No Man’s Land: The Last Tribes of the Plains, MSNBC, http:// 
www.msnbc.com/interactives/geography-of-poverty/nw.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 127.  Howard Fischer, Arizona Court Rules Against Tribe in Adoption Case, ARIZ. DAILY 
STAR (Aug. 12, 2016), http://tucson.com/news/state-and-regional/arizona-court-rules-
against-tribe-in-adoption-case/article_4726989a-e65b-5653-833f-1667c4ff3506.html. 
 128.  Associated Press, Judge Greenlights Tribe’s Suit Against State, NATIVE TIMES (Oct. 
28, 2016), http://www.nativetimes.com/index.php/news/tribal/13928-judge-greenlights-
tribe-s-suit-against-state-2. 
 129.  Shawn Regan, 5 Ways the Government Keeps Native Americans in Poverty, FORBES 
(Mar. 13, 2014, 6:07 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/03/13/5-ways-the-
government-keeps-native-americans-in-poverty/#1e4ec82d6cc6. 
 130.  Brad Plumer, The Battle Over the Dakota Access Pipeline, Explained, VOX (Nov. 29, 
2016, 5:47 PM), http://www.vox.com/2016/9/9/12862958/dakota-access-pipeline-fight. 
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the tribe’s economic and political independence, and prevent 
opportunities for state-tribe alliances to form.  
When tribal sovereignty is respected, on the other hand, tribes can 
become powerful state allies. The experience of the Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribal Nation131 illustrates this point well. Beginning with the 
Pequot War in the 1630s and continuing through subsequent 
struggles with the government, the Nation’s once-bustling 
community of 8000 members continually shrank.132 By the 1950s, the 
Pequots were so run down by federal and state government action 
that only one of its members still resided on the reservation.133 
However, after members started to push back and negotiate the return 
of stolen land, the government agreed to give that land, and some 
additional payment, back to the Nation.134 As a result, members 
started returning to the reservation and the Nation became more 
prosperous.135 Recently, the Mashantucket Pequot tribe has provided 
economic support to the State of Connecticut.136   It is likely that when 
states more fully recognize tribal sovereignty, tribes will operate more 
successfully on their own and become more valuable political and 
economic partners.  
In cigarette tax compacting, tribal sovereignty is particularly 
important. It is clear that, as sovereigns, tribal leaders deserve space at 
the negotiating table for political dealings involving their land. 
Moreover, tribes that are given that space are more likely to cooperate 
in negotiations and enforcement.137 Furthermore, tribes that 
 
 131.  Clarkson & Sebenius, supra note 120, at 1049; Tribal History, MASHANTUCKET 
(WESTERN) PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION, https://www.mptn-nsn.gov/tribalhistory.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2019). 
 132.  Tribal History, supra note 131. 
 133.  Clarkson & Sebenius, supra note 120, at 1049. 
 134.  Id. at 1050. 
 135.  Id. But see Tatiana Schlossberg, A Connecticut Indian Tribe Faces Its Eroding Fortunes 
from Foxwoods, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/01/ 
nyregion/pequot-indian-tribe-faces-its-eroding-fortunes-from-foxwoods.html?_r=0. 
 136.  Foxwoods Hits $4 Billion Lifetime Contribution to CT with June Slot Revenue, E. 
CONN. CHAMBER OF COM. (July 15, 2017), http://info.chamberect.com/news/details/ 
foxwoods-resort-casino-hits-4-billion-lifetime-contribution-to-connecticut-with-june-slot-reve 
nue-07-15-2017. 
 137.  Although this may seem like a commonsense assumption, it should also be noted that 
some research bolsters this assumption by suggesting that hierarchical relationships impede 
cooperation. Katherine A. Cronin et al., Hierarchy is Detrimental for Human Cooperation, 5 
SCI. REP. 1 (2015). 
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benefit  from negotiations become more self-sufficient, stronger 
allies  generally. 
Some states might fear creating cigarette compacts with tribes 
under the assumption that the cigarette trade provides tribes with a 
critical source of revenue. However, the cigarette trade has not 
provided a perfect solution to tribal economic problems in recent 
years. In the Seneca Nation, where the cigarette industry is very large, 
one study showed that profits from cigarette sales benefited only a few 
members of the tribe while many remained in poverty.138 It is because 
of scenarios like these that some tribes disfavor keeping the cigarette 
trade on tribal land.139 Like all communities, tribes want to be 
economically independent and healthy, and the cigarette trade is not 
a long-term vehicle that will meet those needs. 
It is likely that tribal leaders who are heard, respected, and 
benefited in compact negotiations are more likely to serve as effective 
allies in the fight against illicit cigarette dealings than those who are 
not. While states that engage in compacting generally already show 
respect for tribal leadership by bringing tribal leaders to the 
negotiating table, compacts can be improved by better protecting and 
promoting tribal interests.  The remainder of this Part will discuss how 
the two Kansas compacts under review discuss tribal sovereignty and 
then suggest how considerations of tribal sovereignty can be bolstered 
even further.  
It should be noted that although a tribe’s treatment in a compact 
may not translate to a tribe’s treatment in real life, the language used 
to describe a tribe in a compact is important because it provides a 
foundation for compact formation and interpretation and serves as a 
model for future policymaking. Therefore, this analysis will critique 
even the smallest details—such as the use or placement of words in 
these compacts—to determine how compacts treat tribal sovereignty. 
1. Tribal sovereignty in the Potawatomi Nation compact 
The Potawatomi Nation cigarette compact’s description of tribal 
sovereignty is impressive. The compact’s very first recital boldly 
addresses the subject with this statement: “[T]he [Potawatomi] 
Nation is a federally-recognized Indian tribe possessing and exercising 
 
 138.  Samuel, Ribisl & Williams, supra note 66, at 177. 
 139.  Id. 
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inherent sovereign powers of self-government, as defined and 
recognized by treaties, federal laws and federal court decisions, 
and . . . it has responsibilities and needs similar to other governments 
. . . .”140 The second recital contains a parallel statement on the State,141 
which effectively serves to place the Potawatomi Nation and Kansas 
leadership on equal ground. 
The recitals on the importance of tribal leadership continue, 
explaining that “it is in the best interests of both the State and the 
Nation to prevent [cigarette-related] disputes,” paying tribute to “the 
financial, cultural, educational, and economic contributions” of each 
group, and noting that each group “supports the other’s 
governmental responsibilities to provide for and govern its citizens, 
members and territory.”142 
In the main portion of the compact, the wording and substance 
of the Nation’s requirements reflect the State’s respect for the 
Nation.143 For example, although the compact requires the Nation to 
regulate cigarette sales and taxes on its own,144 the State agrees not to 
impose any of its own taxes on cigarettes that tribal retailers sell145 as 
long as the Potawatomi Nation maintains certain minimum cigarette 
tax rates.146 And, in terms of auditing services, Kansas and Potawatomi 
Nation officials work together to contract with an independent 
auditor and split the auditor’s bill evenly.147 These types of freedoms 
give the Potawatomi Nation breathing room to set its own tax rates 
and regulate its own sales.  
2. Tribal sovereignty in the Iowa Tribe of Kansas and 
Nebraska  compact 
Interestingly, the list of recitals in the compact made between 
Kansas and the Iowa Nation of Kansas and Nebraska is a flipped 
version of the State’s compact with the Potawatomi Nation. The 
 
 140.  Potawatomi Nation Compact, supra note 103, at 1. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. §§ 4.01, 5.01. 
 144.  Id. § 4.01. 
 145.  Id. § 5.01(a). 
 146.  Id. § 5.01(b)–(d) (setting minimum requirements for sales taxes and excise taxes). 
 147.  Id. § 6.02. 
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language is often very similar, but in a different order: this compact 
does not explicitly reference tribal sovereignty until the ninth recital.148 
Instead, the first part of the compact focuses heavily on the battle 
between the State of Kansas and various tobacco companies.149 
This recital portrays the State of Kansas as the main actor in this 
compact who, fighting against the abuses of the tobacco industry, 
must reach out to the Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska for 
assistance.150 This portrayal places the tribe in a third-party position in 
the recital narrative rather than as an equal partner in a contract. The 
narrative further paints this picture by assuring readers that any tribal 
efforts to assist the State in its fight will be reimbursed.151 
This treatment of tribal independence and power in the recital is 
paired, interestingly, with a brief main compact body.152 Although this 
compact negotiates the same type of arrangement as the Potawatomi 
Nation compact, it is significantly shorter.153 The length difference is 
due partly to the fact that the Potawatomi compact has its own 
definitions section.154 
The Tribe seems to be treated fairly in the compact’s main 
provisions. For example, this agreement asserts that the Tribe and 
State will work together to hire an auditor.155 The section of the 
contract regarding interpretation of terms explains that “[i]t is the 
intent of the parties that this Compact shall be construed to reflect 
that the parties are of equal stature and dignity and have dealt with 
each other at arm’s length.”156 The Iowa Tribe compact also states that 
the Tribe has the exclusive right to tax buyers on tribal land as long as 
 
 148.  Iowa Tribe Compact, supra note 104. 
 149.  Id. art. I. 
 150.  Id. art. I (“[I]t would be contrary to the policy of Kansas if tobacco product 
manufacturers who determine not to enter into such a settlement could use a resulting cost 
advantage to derive large, short-term profits in the years before liability may arise without 
ensuring that Kansas will have an eventual source of recovery from them if they are proven to 
have acted culpably . . . [and] Kansas entered into a settlement agreement with certain [tobacco 
product manufacturers] . . . .”). 
 151.  Id. art. I (recitals 7–8). But see art. III, § 10. 
 152.  Id. arts. II–III. 
 153.  Id.; Potawatomi Nation Compact, supra note 103. 
 154.  Iowa Tribe Compact, supra note 104, art. III, § 11; Potawatomi Nation Compact, 
supra note 103, art. I. 
 155.  Iowa Tribe Compact, supra note 104, art. II, § 9. 
 156.  Id. art. III, § 10. 
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those taxes exceed 17 cents per pack or $1.70 for ten.157 This contract 
also explicitly omits sacred tobacco from the requirements of the 
compact,158 which accommodates and facilitates the Tribe’s expression 
of religious beliefs. Therefore, although tribal sovereignty is not 
placed at the forefront of the compact’s introduction, the tribe seems 
to have negotiated several fair terms for itself in the body of 
the  compact. 
3. Critique of tribal sovereignty in the Potawatomi Nation and Iowa 
Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska compacts 
In a way, both the Potawatomi Nation and Iowa Tribe of Kansas 
and Nebraska compacts incorporate ideas of tribal sovereignty. 
However, despite the fact that both compacts use identical sovereignty 
provisions, the placement of those statements impacts their respective 
narratives in important ways.159 The Potawatomi Nation compact 
begins with a powerful assertion of the rights and independent 
governing powers of the local tribe.160 The Iowa Tribe compact leaves 
its discussion of tribal sovereignty to the end of the introduction, 
focusing primarily on the battle between Kansas and the tobacco 
industry.161 This difference in treatment may be trivial, but rhetorically 
it creates in the mind of the reader two opposite impressions—in one, 
the tribe is an important player in compact formation, but in the other, 
the tribe is a means to an end. 
Both compacts treat tribal sovereignty appropriately on a practical 
level, and this is something that all cigarette compacts must do. Of 
course, the mere fact that the State used a compact rather than a 
statute to bring about cigarette tax reform signals that the State viewed 
these tribes as worthy of meeting at the negotiating table. In addition, 
these compacts are particularly impressive because both give tribes 
significant leeway to set their own taxes and keep those taxes for tribal 
use.162 These two provisions, independent tax-setting and within-tribe 
use of taxes, show respect for tribes as independent entities. 
 
 157.  Id. art. II, §§ 10–13. 
 158.  Id. art. II, § 3; see also Potawatomi Nation Compact, supra note 103, § 5.02(h). 
 159.  See supra Sections IV.B.1–B.2. 
 160.  See Potawatomi Nation Contract, supra note 103. 
 161.  See Iowa Tribe Compact, supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 162.  See Potawatomi Nation Contract, supra note 103; Iowa Tribe Compact, supra 
note 104. 
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Overall, these two compacts, while differing in their narrative 
style, both promote tribal sovereignty to some extent. In addition, the 
Potawatomi Nation compact sets up the tribe as an equally important 
partner with the State; in so doing, the compact helps to unify both 
governments in the fight against cigarette bootlegging. Future 
compacts should assert tribal sovereignty early on and ensure that 
tribes are receiving adequate consideration for the help they provide 
to states: doing so promotes tribal economy and fosters the spirit 
of  cooperation helpful in combating illicit cigarette dealings 
involving  tribes.  
C. Tobacco Control 
Both states and tribes stand to gain by making cigarette compacts 
as effective as possible from a public health perspective. The staggering 
economic and public health burden of smoking on states is already 
well known,163 and cigarette smoking is also a large problem on Native 
American lands. For example, Native American adults have the highest 
prevalence of commercial tobacco product use in the country (over 
forty percent in one 2013 study)164 and experience high death rates 
from multiple related chronic diseases.165 Many also live in stifling 
poverty,166 which is likely exacerbated by the need to purchase 
cigarettes.  With this in mind, states and tribes should be actively 
engaged in forming agreements that combat illicit cigarette dealings 
and, by implication, the population’s dependence on tobacco, as 
effectively as possible. 
 
 163.  See, e.g., The Costs of Tobacco on NY State, N.Y. STATE SMOKERS’ QUITLINE, 
https://www.nysmokefree.com/EMP/EMPSubpage.aspx?Pn=TOBACOCOSTS (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2017) (“Adults who die each year in New York from their own smoking: 25,500 . . . 
Annual smoking-related health care costs and lost productivity in NY total $14.2 billion[.]”). 
 164.  American Indians/Alaska Natives and Tobacco Use, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION (citing Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed 
Tables, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. tbl. 2.26B, http://www. 
samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-DetTabs2013/NSDUHDetTabs2013.htm#ta 
b2.26b (last visited Dec. 2, 2017)), http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/disparities/american-
indians/index.htm (last visited Dec. 2,  2017)  
 165.  David K. Espey et al., Leading Causes of Death and All-Cause Mortality in American 
Indians and Alaska Natives, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S303, S307–09 (2014), http:// 
ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2013.301798. 
 166.  See Jens Manuel Krogstad, One-in-Four Native Americans and Alaska Natives are 
Living in Poverty, PEW RES. CTR. (June 13, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/06/13/1-in-4-native-americans-and-alaska-natives-are-living-in-poverty/. 
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Although some may assume tribes are not interested in tobacco 
prevention because of the use of traditional tobacco, that assumption 
would be misguided.167  First, not all tribes use traditional tobacco168 
and traditional tobacco has a special religious purpose that is often 
considered distinct from that of commercial tobacco.169 Second, while 
some tribes have taken to using commercial tobacco for religious 
ceremonies, a movement among Native Americans has grown in an 
effort to correct that practice.170  Third, there are tribes that recognize 
the public health dangers of the commercial cigarette trade.171 
Therefore, some tribes may be very much interested in earmarking 
cigarette revenue for tobacco control.  
The two compacts analyzed here divide tax revenue and do not 
limit how that revenue can be spent.172 A more effective way to combat 
illicit cigarette dealings is to require each party to use cigarette taxes 
for tobacco control efforts. After all, one of the easiest ways to curb 
practices like bootlegging is to reduce a population’s dependence on 
and interest in cigarettes. 
If cigarette tax revenue is dedicated to anti-smoking efforts, the 
resulting revenue could have a significant impact on both the 
prevalence of smoking, and, by consequence, the incidence of illicit 
cigarette dealings.  This type of effort is likely most effective when 
both parties earmark any funds coming from the compact for tobacco 
control. The purpose of this section is to analyze the extent to which 
tribal tobacco control is discussed in these two Kansas compacts. 
1. Compact with the Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska 
Smoking-related health plays an interesting role in the opening 
recitals of the Iowa Tribe compact. The main narrative of this opening 
 
 167.  See, e.g., Smoking, Race and Ethnicity: Tobacco Use and Native Americans, TOBACCO 
FREE LIFE, https://tobaccofreelife.org/resources/smoking-among-native-americans/ (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2017) (“With numerous ceremonial uses for tobacco and a deeply ingrained 
cultural tradition, . . .  Native Americans have a particularly big problem with smoking and 
comparatively less motivation to quit.”). 
 168.  Traditional vs. Commercial Tobacco, KEEP IT SACRED NATIONAL NATIVE 
NETWORK, http://keepitsacred.itcmi.org/tobacco-and-tradition/traditional-v-commercial/ 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2017). 
 169. See id. 
 170. See id. (referring to the “Keep it Sacred” Native Network itself). 
 171. Samuel, Ribisl & Williams, supra note 66, at 177. 
 172. See, e.g., infra Sections IV.C.1–C.2. 
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focuses on Kansas’s fight against tobacco companies. Rather than 
emphasizing that industry payments are needed to stop smoking, the 
agreement specifies that Kansas needs money to deal with the 
consequences of smoking.173 The first recital explicitly states that “it is 
in the best interests of the State of Kansas . . . to continue to reduce 
the financial burdens imposed on [it] by cigarette smoking and that 
said costs continue to be borne by tobacco product manufacturers,”174 
while the third explains that payments from tobacco companies are 
meant to serve as a form of pre-emptive “recovery” in case these 
companies are found liable for abuse.175 The purpose, then, is not to 
prevent smoking—either on reservations or within the State—but to 
mitigate its effects. 
The fact that tobacco control principles are avoided in this 
introduction is further emphasized by the compact’s second recital, 
which contains the only explicit compact reference to public health.176 
The compact explains that members of the tobacco industry who are 
not part of the Master Settlement Agreement “pay substantial sums to 
Kansas . . . to fund a national foundation devoted to . . . public health; 
and . . . make substantial changes in their advertising and marketing 
practices and corporate culture, with the intention of reducing 
underage smoking.”177 This summary of the Master Settlement 
Agreement is helpful background for this compact because it shows 
that both public health and tobacco control are central principles 
behind tobacco industry payments to the State. 
Unfortunately, tobacco control is not mentioned elsewhere in the 
compact.178 No sales tax funds are explicitly earmarked for smoking 
 
 173.  See Iowa Tribe Compact, supra note 104, art. I. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Iowa Tribe Compact, supra note 104. It should be noted that there are references in 
both the Iowa Tribe Compact and the Potawatomi Nation Compact to statutes and agreements 
that do talk more explicitly about public health and tobacco, such as the 2012 Term Sheet 
Settlement, which describes payments that tribes can use for public health generally and not for 
certain pro-smoking purposes. Id. art. II, § 14; Potawatomi Nation Compact, supra note 103, 
§ 1.01 (“Secondary Settlement Agreement”); 2012 Term Sheet Settlement § 3(B)(2)(d). 
However, the author was not able to find any specific, proactive tobacco control funding use 
requirements in outside references that would be mandatory for tribes to implement. 
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prevention on reservation lands in the compact itself.179 The omission 
may suggest that the compact is motivated more strongly by financial 
gain than by tobacco-focused public health considerations.180  
2. The Potawatomi Nation compact 
Of course, if the Iowa Tribe compact can be considered 
minimalistic in its treatment of public health, the Potawatomi Nation 
compact can be as well. Both compacts share the same public health 
and smoking clauses.181 However, in the case of the Potawatomi 
Nation compact, the public health and smoking provisions are buried 
twelve recitals into the introduction,182 suggesting that its use of funds 
to prevent smoking is a side-goal rather than a main objective. And, 
as in the Iowa Tribe compact, no explicit mention of tobacco control 
earmarking was found elsewhere in the document.183 
3. Critique of tobacco control in these two compacts 
These two Kansas compacts point to the ideal purpose behind 
cigarette taxes but could potentially do more to promote that purpose. 
If tobacco control is truly a motivator for cigarette taxes and compacts, 
those funds should be used for some kind of anti-smoking aim. 
Otherwise, those taxes become a source of revenue, which makes 
states and tribes beneficiaries of the tobacco industry. In other words, 
when policymakers’ funded state programs rely on smoker tax revenue 
to continue, there is no incentive to see smokers quit.184 
There are several changes policymakers can make to better 
incorporate public health and tribal sovereignty themes into cigarette 
tax compacts. The next section provides these recommendations. 
 
 179.  Iowa Tribe Compact, supra note 104. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Potawatomi Nation Compact, supra note 103, art. I.; Iowa Tribe Compact, supra 
note 104, art. I. 
 182.  Potawatomi Nation Compact, supra note 103, art. I. 
 183.  Id. There is also evidence that the Potawatomi Nation did not intend to use funding 
from the agreement exclusively for tobacco control. Hellman, supra note 100 (“Her tribe also 
will get a small tobacco payment from the Master Settlement Agreement, which Onnen said will 
likely go toward the tribe’s general fund or to health center operations.”). 
 184.  See generally May, supra note 50.  
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V. IMPROVING COMPACTS: FOUR SUGGESTIONS 
The way tribal sovereignty and public health are addressed in 
compacts affects their potential effectiveness in combating the illicit 
cigarette market. If tribes are not respected, it is unlikely that they will 
cooperate with state governments. If public health is not placed at the 
heart of compacting, neither states nor tribes will be incentivized to 
actively promote anti-smoking efforts.  
This Part makes four recommendations to help states keep tribal 
sovereignty and public health at the heart of cigarette tax compacting 
and the fight against illicit cigarette dealings.  
1. States should codify rules for compact formation.  
2. Compact introductions should explicitly focus on tribal 
sovereignty and smoking prevention.  
3. State taxes should be kept out of the reservation. 
4. Both the state and the tribe should earmark tax proceeds 
for smoking prevention and cessation programs in 
compacts. 
A. Codify Rules for Compact Formation 
States can and should form compacts with Native American tribes 
whenever possible, and an effective way to ensure that state and tribal 
leaders work together is to mandate compact formation legislatively 
(either on the state or federal level). Multiple states have already done 
this.185 At the beginning of 2015, fourteen states had legislation in 
place that specifically authorized the use of state-tribal cigarette 
compacts, including Washington, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.186 
Washington’s compacting law187 illustrates how beneficial codified 
compacting rules can be for state-tribe relations. Under this law, the 
governor is authorized to make cigarette compacts with Native 
American tribes.188 The law also lays out some of the basic terms of 
those compacts,189 so the governor can do the legislature’s will while 
 
 185.  E.g., DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i33–i34. 
 186. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 128–29; DeLong et al., supra note 52, 
at i34 tbl 2. 
 187.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.06.460 (West 2009). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
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still retaining enough flexibility to work with individual tribes. In so 
doing, the legislature streamlined the process of compact formation 
and showed tribes that they valued state-tribe cooperation.190 
Of course, creating laws that regulate compact formation can be 
problematic if they are too loose or too restrictive, so legislators need 
to strike a careful balance between the two. States that choose to set 
rules on these kinds of compacts should make rules strong enough to 
meet public health goals but flexible enough to allow tribes to 
negotiate terms. The Washington law, for example, sets a minimum 
standard cigarette rate for compacts.191 That minimum rate may be too 
low to prevent bootlegging, or, in some cases, it might be considered 
too high to agree to. Therefore, states should create restrictions based 
on sound economic and public health research in order to most 
effectively combat bootlegging through mandated compacts. 
B. Focus Compact Recitals on Tribal Sovereignty  
and Smoking Prevention 
In the two Kansas compacts evaluated earlier, the Potawatomi 
Nation’s recital read like an economic agreement between sovereigns, 
while the Iowa Tribe’s recital read like a state fight against the tobacco 
industry that required tribal assistance.192 A clear description of the 
role of tribal sovereignty and smoking prevention in cigarette 
compacting would not have had a direct legal impact on these 
compacts, but they would have provided a helpful guide for compact 
drafters, interpreters, and other tribes interested in producing their 
own agreements. 
One example of a hybrid purpose statement that incorporates both 
tribal sovereignty and public health elements is located in Washington 
State’s law authorizing cigarette tax negotiations with the Puyallup 
tribe.193 In that statute, the legislature explains its purpose is to “(a) 
[produce] an increase in prices through a flat tax [that] will reduce 
much of the competitive advantage that has historically existed due to 
 
 190.  WASH. H.R. 59-5794, 1st Sess., at 2 (2005) (“This bill will end the dispute between 
the Puyallup Tribe and the state over cigarette taxes. It is a cooperative approach between the 
tribe and the Department of Revenue. It is good for the state and the tribe. It recognizes unique 
factors that apply to the Puyallup Tribe’s situation.”). 
 191.  § 43.06.460; see also supra note 31. 
 192.  See supra Part IV. 
 193.  WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 43.06.465 (West 2017). 
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the discrepancy in the difference between state and tribal taxes, and 
(b) [ensure] that . . . tribal retailers . . . remain in business under the 
changed circumstances.”194 Although this contractual language does 
not explicitly mention the public health benefits of minimizing state-
tribe tax differentials (through the prevention of illicit cigarette 
dealings), the fact that this agreement focuses on those differentials 
while still considering the needs of tribal retailers shows both public 
health considerations and tribal sovereignty can be appropriately 
incorporated in the same statute. 
Cigarette tax compacts are agreements between two sovereign 
entities that should have a tobacco control motive. An ideal compact 
should pair a strong introduction on tribal sovereignty with an equally 
powerful discussion on the purpose of cigarette taxes in promoting 
public health. 
C. Keep State Taxes at the Reservation 
Even when a compact includes a firm statement of purpose, that 
stated purpose means nothing unless the body of the compact carries 
through on that compact’s mission. In terms of tribal sovereignty, this 
means a state should not try to reach into tribal retailer pockets to pick 
up taxes that the state thinks should belong to itself. Although, as 
previously mentioned, it is legal for states to collect taxes on cigarettes 
sold to nonresidents,195 such a practice could also be considered 
overreaching. As tribal chairwoman Liana Onnen of the Potawatomi 
Nation explains, “We use terms like self-determination and 
sovereignty . . . . It’s that ability to self-govern and to self-determine 
how we’re going to handle our taxing and our business.”196 
The Kansas compacts, which keep tribal taxes on the reservation, 
are not the only documents that support tribal taxing independence. 
Washington’s law on cigarette compact formation specifies that tribes 
forming compacts with the State can set their own tax rates “in lieu of 
the state cigarette and state and local sales and use taxes.”197 
 
 194.  § 43.06.465(1). 
 195.  Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 
160 (1980). 
 196.  See Hellman, supra note 100. 
 197.  § 43.06.460. 
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D. Mutually Earmark Tax Proceeds  
for Smoking Prevention and Cessation 
Cigarette taxes have the potential to curb smoking rates, and the 
purpose of compacting is to prevent state users from circumventing 
those taxes. Tobacco prevention and control, therefore, lie at the heart 
of this kind of legislation, and they must remain at the heart of any 
related agreements if they are to have their intended effect on illicit 
cigarette dealings. Although state and tribal sovereignty both need to 
be respected, both states and tribes must acknowledge the power they 
have to incentivize the other to act. 
In compact-making, both states and tribes should ensure that a 
substantial portion of tax revenue is earmarked for public health 
purposes in general and for smoking prevention and control in 
particular. This means that funds not only should be allocated 
specifically to that purpose but also should be prohibited from shifting 
back to the tobacco industry. In the case of Native American tribes, 
who may experience economic hardship as a result of cigarette tax 
increases, additional funds should also be used to spur non-tobacco-
related industries. 
Although both states and tribes should do this of their own 
accord, each group has opportunities in compacting to incentivize the 
other to dedicate tax proceeds to smoking control. The State of 
Nevada did this to some extent in legislation authorizing its own state-
tribe cigarette tax compacts.198 According to Nevada law, the money 
that tribes receive from their own state-tribe cigarette agreements 
must go to “public safety on the qualified tribal land of the tribe or 
[to] social services for tribal members, including . . . health care or 
education, and not [to] any function that could directly or indirectly 
promote or reduce the costs of cigarette production, marketing 
or  sales.”199 
In the case of the Kansas compacts discussed earlier, the State 
needed tribal assistance in order to continue to receive funds from the 
tobacco industry. The Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska and the 
Potawatomi Nation both could have put pressure on the State to 
earmark state funds for tobacco prevention and control, and vice versa. 
 
 198.  NEV. REV. STAT. § 370A.157 (2015). 
 199.  Id.; see also TERM SHEET § III(B)(2)(d) (2012), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/ 
agweb/pdfs/tobacco/term_sheet.pdf. 
6.SLOAN_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2018  10:53 AM 
1261 Tribal Sovereignty and Tobacco Control 
 1295 
Tribes and states involved in compacting should consider making 
mutual agreements to allocate cigarette tax funds to tobacco control. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
State-tribe compacting can be a powerful tool for preventing illicit 
cigarette dealings. However, not all compacts are created equal, and 
in at least some cases, tribal sovereignty and tobacco control do not 
seem to be playing as strong a role as they should be in compact 
formation. By showing respect for tribal sovereignty, tribes can 
become stronger allies in tobacco control enforcement efforts. By 
allocating compact funds to effective tobacco control programs, both 
parties can curb the market for illicit cigarette trading. States need to 
create legislation that encourages state leaders to develop compacts 
with Native American tribes, ideally for all state-tribal issues, but 
specifically for cigarette tax compacts. In those compacts, public 
health and tribal sovereignty should be featured prominently in 
compact purpose statements. And, in the main body of these 
compacts, states and tribes should work together to produce a system 
where tribes tax members and nonmembers for cigarettes and then 
keep all revenue. The proceeds of those taxes, in addition to the taxes 
from state cigarette taxes on state land, should all go toward tobacco 
prevention and control. 
This four-part strategy should create strong state-tribal 
partnerships that discourage the growth of the illicit cigarette trade, 
keep cigarette taxes high, and discourage smoking in the population. 
Public health and tribal sovereignty are not enemies in cigarette tax 
compacting. Both tribal leadership and states can acknowledge each 
other’s taxing power and use their own power to incentivize fund 
expenditure for what it should cover—tobacco prevention 
and  control. 
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